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Decentralization, Collusion and Coalmine Deaths

时间:2017-02-26 09:14,来源:白鲨在线

《分权、合谋与矿难》
 
贾瑞雪(UCSD) 聂辉华(人民大学)
 
摘要:这篇文章考察了规制者与企业之间的政企合谋如何影响了中国煤矿企业的生产安全。我们认为,分权导致政企合谋更加容易,并且当合谋的交易费用更低时这种效应更加明显。通过分析分权与规制者的个人特征,本文检验了上述假说。利用煤矿领域的分权和集权改革,我们发现:分权带来了更高的矿难死亡率。进一步,死亡率的增加对那些有更低交易费用(用籍贯度量)的规制者来说更明显。
 
Decentralization, Collusion and Coalmine Deaths
 
Ruixue Jia and Huihua Nie
 
Abstract—This paper investigates how collusion between regulators and firms affects workplace safety using the case of China’s coal mine deaths. We argue that decentralization makes collusion more likely and that its effect is strengthened if the transaction costs of collusion are lower. These hypotheses are tested by investigating the impact of decentralization con- tingent on regulators’ characteristics. Exploring both decentralization and centralization reforms in the coal mine industry, we find that decentraliza- tion is correlated with an increase in coal mine death rates. Moreover, this increase in mortality is larger for the regulators with lower transaction costs (proxied by the locality of origin).

本文于2015年7月被世界顶级期刊REStat接受发表,2017年2月正式刊印,引用出处:Jia, Ruixue, Huihua Nie, 2017, “Decentralization, Collusion and Coalmine Deaths",  Review of Economics and Statistics,99(1): 105–118.
 
官方下载链接http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00563,进入链接后点击“Supplementary Material”,可发现全文附录与本文所使用的数据和程序

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decentralization, collusion and coalmine death

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