



## Are foreign monks better at chanting? The effect of 'airborne' SDICs on anti-corruption

Huihua Nie & Mengqi Wang

To cite this article: Huihua Nie & Mengqi Wang (2016) Are foreign monks better at chanting? The effect of 'airborne' SDICs on anti-corruption, *Economic and Political Studies*, 4:1, 19-38

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2016.1152096>



Published online: 04 May 2016.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 1



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

RESEARCH ARTICLE

## Are foreign monks better at chanting? The effect of ‘airborne’ SDICs on anti-corruption

Huihua Nie<sup>a</sup> and Mengqi Wang<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>School of Economics and Microdata and Empirical Method Research Center (MEMR), Renmin University of China (RUC), Beijing, P.R. China; <sup>b</sup>National School of Development, Peking University, Beijing, China

### ABSTRACT

The independence of supervision agency is of great importance for anti-corruption. After the leadership transition of the provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2006, Secretaries of Discipline Inspection Commission (SDICs) were suddenly dispatched from the centre or transferred from another province in China (‘airborne’ SDICs) to enhance their independence in inspecting corruption cases. To investigate the effect of this policy reform, we collect data of SDICs and anti-corruption in 31 provinces from 2003 to 2014, and evaluate this policy using the difference-in-differences econometrics method. We find that there is no significant effect of these ‘airborne’ SDICs whether from the centre or another province on anti-corruption. This result is robust to different measurements of anti-corruption and subsamples. We argue that the dispatch of external SDICs is not enough to ensure the independence of supervision agency, because local discipline inspection commissions (DICs) are still subject to local Chinese Communist Party committees in terms of personnel, funds and property. This paper has important policy implications for the current anti-corruption campaign in China.

### ARTICLE HISTORY


Received 15 April 2015  
Revised 13 August 2015  
Published online 22 April 2016

### KEYWORDS

Anti-corruption; China; corruption; Secretaries of Discipline Inspection Commission

## Introduction

In both theory and practice, the independence of supervision agency is of vital importance for anti-corruption. Independence means that supervision is free from the interference of parties, groups or individuals (Guo 2012). Independent anti-corruption agencies can work professionally and continuously without political interference (Meagher 2004), increasing the probability of corrupt bureaucrats being investigated (Huther and Shah 2000) and thus achieving better results. For example, the Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong and Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in Singapore are independent anti-corruption agencies attached to the highest administrative authority which play an important role in helping Hong Kong and Singapore to become two of the most incorruptible countries (regions) in Asia (Quah 1999). On the other hand, cross-country experience has shown that once

CONTACT Huihua Nie  [niehuihua@vip.163.com](mailto:niehuihua@vip.163.com)  School of Economics and Microdata and Empirical Method Research Center (MEMR), Renmin University of China (RUC) Beijing, P.R. China

© 2016 Economic and Political Studies

anti-corruption agencies are subject in terms of careers, wages and the budget to those who are being supervised, there will be corruption in supervision, and no efficient work can be done to supervise bureaucrats (Transparency International 2007).

The Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the most crucial organ for anti-corruption in China. The reform of the DIC system means DICs' de jure independence has been gradually increasing. Since their reestablishment in 1977, local DICs were firstly led by the local CCP committees at the same level, and then under the dual leadership of the local CCP committees and the upper-level DICs. After the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Party Congress, the upper-level DICs' leadership was further emphasized. The CCP has continued to strengthen the vertical administration in the DIC system, and to reduce the local CCP committees' intervention in DICs' work. Remarkably, since 2006, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) has controlled the nomination and appointment of Secretaries of Discipline Inspection Commissions (SDICs) at the provincial level. Moreover, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Party Congress adopted the *Decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, in which there is an express provision that "nomination and assessment of secretaries and deputy secretaries of Party commissions for discipline inspection at all levels will be conducted mainly by a Party commission for discipline inspection of a higher level."<sup>1</sup>

Before 2006, provincial SDICs<sup>2</sup> were almost always promoted from local party committees, and only a few were transferred from other provinces or from the centre. In 2005, for instance, only 7 of 31 provinces had SDICs transferred from outside provinces, and 24 SDICs were all locally promoted.<sup>3</sup> However, situations changed after 2006. Direct dispatch by the CDIC or transfer from other provinces, both of which are 'airborne', has gradually become the main source of SDICs. As shown in Figure 1, the proportion of airborne SDICs<sup>4</sup> increased rapidly after 2006. At the end of 2014, there were 22 SDICs airborne in 31 provinces, more than 70% of the total. Of these, six SDICs took office after the 18th Party Congress (held in November 2012).<sup>5</sup> In an authoritarian system, the power of appointment and removal of personnel is undoubtedly the most important political power. Theoretically, compared with the locally promoted SDICs, those airborne from the centre or other provinces have neither political connection (*guanxi*) with the local secretary of provincial party committee or




Figure 1. Proportions of airborne SDICs from 1994 to 2014. Data source: the authors' dataset.

provincial governor nor complex network connections in the locale and thus should be more independent in respect of combating corruption of local officials.<sup>6</sup>

Here is the problem. In practice, do airborne SDICs have significant positive effects on anti-corruption? On the one hand, it is good to reduce intervention in DICs' work, because SDICs are no longer appointed by local CCP committees. On the other hand, the de facto independence of DICs depends on many factors; in particular, local CCP committees still restrict DICs in terms of personnel, funds and property. Hence, the effect of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption is uncertain. Answers to the above problem directly influence the evaluation of current anti-corruption policy and further institutional reform in China. However, as far as we know, no rigorous empirical research has been done on this issue.

On 6 August 2006, the general office of the CCP Central Committee issued the *Regulations of the Party and Government Leading Cadres' Rotation Work*, which required cadres' rotation, pointing out that the SDICs at or above the county level were the rotation object. Cadres' rotation is a national policy, and has nothing to do with characteristics of individual provinces. This exogenous policy shock meant that during the transition of SDICs in 2006–2007, there were 10 provinces whose SDIC source changed from local to, "airborne". It provides a good quasi-natural experiment for our economics research. Therefore, based on provincial level panel data from 2003 to 2014, using the difference-in-differences (DID) method, this paper investigates the influence of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption efforts, as indicated by the average amount of corrupt money found among arrested corrupt officials. Regression results show after controlling provincial and SDICs' personal characteristics that whether SDICs are airborne, including being directly dispatched by the centre and transferred from other provinces, has no significant impact on anti-corruption efforts.

For robustness checks, we collect data of Chinese over-vice-bureau-level (*fu tingji*) corrupt officials from 2003 to 2014, and calculate another provincial indicator of anti-corruption efforts. With neither the 2003–2014 sample nor the subsample of 2003–2009 does airborne SDICs affect anti-corruption efforts significantly. This indicates that airborne SDICs have not achieved the attempted effect. We speculate that airborne SDICs are still subject to the local party committees, revealing the weakness in DICs' independence.<sup>7</sup>

We focus on the characteristics of Chinese SDICs for three reasons. First of all, globally, anti-corruption agency is an important part of combating corruption (De Sousa 2010). The DIC is the vital anti-corruption agency in China, whose independence has direct influence on anti-corruption efforts. Second, under the authoritarian system, SDICs have considerable discretion in corruption investigations (Manion 1997). China's current anti-corruption operation is dominated by administrative power and is campaign-based. SDICs, the major persons-in-charge of the anti-corruption agency, are able to affect the timing, intensity, target officials and investigation order of anti-corruption work (Quade 2007; Wu and Zhu 2011; Guo 2012). Third, the characteristics of the government and party leaders are one of the factors which explain their performance. Literature has used the career experiences and other characteristics of leaders to analyse Chinese political and economic problems, such as Cheng and White (1990, 2003), Zang (1993) and Nie and Wang (2014). In conclusion, it is essential to analyse

the effectiveness of the Chinese fight against corruption using the characteristics of SDICs.

This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it links the independence of supervision agency with anti-corruption efforts, and is the first empirical study on the influence of the independence of Chinese supervision agency on anti-corruption. Independence of anti-corruption agency is an acknowledged factor in efficient corruption control (Pope 1999; Quah 1999; Pope and Vogl 2000; Meagher 2004, 2005). However, the existing literature usually comprises case studies at national level and lacks empirical analysis. For example, Quah (1999) compares three different anti-corruption patterns and their effects in five Asian countries. He finds that independent anti-corruption agencies in China's Hong Kong and Singapore had better results than those lacking independence in Mongolia. In the case of China, although the anti-corruption institutions among provinces are the same, different characteristics of SDICs can also lead to different anti-corruption efforts. Therefore, this paper, based on panel data at provincial level, empirically analyses the effect of the independence of supervision agency on anti-corruption efforts for the first time. Moreover, we take advantage of the quasi-natural experiment introduced by the policy change in 2006, with the DID method, ingeniously solving the endogenous problem.

Second, this paper explains the causes of the spread of corruption in China from a new perspective, i.e. the lack of independent supervision agency, which weakens anti-corruption efforts. As regards the causes of corruption, the existing literature mainly discusses them in respect of economic development, opening policy, political or fiscal decentralisation, media freedom, education, the rule of law, culture or religion and so on (Dong and Torgler 2013; Nie 2014). As regards China, there is a focus on the impact of reforms (Wu 1988; Lu 2000). Guo (2008) offers more detail accounts by dividing the reform into four areas, namely, marketisation, privatisation, decentralisation and globalisation, and lists 15 channels that could generate corruption. He (2000) summarises why corruption arose and spread in the reform era: dual-track price systems, relative reduction of officials' income, loopholes in institutions, incompleteness of political reform, decline in the costs of corruption, and certain traditional and international factors. Yet, the independence of supervision institutions has been ignored. Our exploration of the various anti-corruption efforts influenced by the independence of supervision agencies may therefore provide a new explanation of the spread of corruption in China.

Third, this paper offers a unique perspective on the internal operating mechanism of the Chinese government. Behind China's rapid economic development, the operating mechanism of the CCP and government, such as the central-local relationship (Wong 1987), the horizontal and vertical mechanism (*tiaokuai*) in government management (Mertha 2005), the *bianzhi* system (Burns 2003; Brødsgaard 2002) and the cadre management system (Manion 1985; Edin 2003), has been highly concerned. DICs' operation mechanism has an important influence on the integrity and efficiency of government. Nevertheless, some of the literature works mention the function and performance of the DIC system although Guo (2014) describes the organization's structure, function and operation. Our paper pays close attention to the changes in SDICs and their impact on anti-corruption.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section “Institutional background” introduces the institutional background. Section “Data” describes the data sources, variables and estimating equations. Section “Empirical results” presents the empirical results and robustness checks. Section “Conclusion” draws concluding remarks.

## Institutional background

### *Discipline Inspection Commission*

As its function and power expand gradually, the DIC is becoming the major anti-corruption agency under the leadership of the CCP in China (Guo 2014). The discipline inspection system of the CCP in China is rooted in the tradition of the Leninist vanguard party, whose purpose is to maintain the party’s discipline and curb bureaucracy.<sup>8</sup> At the beginning of the establishment of the DIC, its main function was merely to deal with violations by party members and cadres. After the reform in 1978, the DIC’s responsibilities involved reviewing discipline, investigating cases, punishing officials, formulating rules of the party’s discipline and integrity, carrying out moral education for party members, etc. In 2002, the 16th Party Congress decided that the CDIC should be the chief coordinator of all anti-corruption attempts,<sup>9</sup> which was marked by the fact that the DIC has become the leading agency of anti-corruption operation and an essential institution for maintaining the party’s justification and leadership (Gong 2008).

The process of carrying out anti-corruption work by DICs mainly includes the following steps. The first is to discover cases of violation and carry out investigation, and then to implement double designation (*shuanggui*), which means the guilty official confesses his or her crime at a stipulated time and place with accompanying personnel from the DIC. After this procedure, the DIC decides penalties according to the party’s discipline rules and with the approval of the party committee at the same level. If the case involves illegal behaviour, the DIC transfers the investigation files to procuratorial entities, who then have the responsibility for court referral after confirmation. Finally, sentence is pronounced by the court.

However, the anti-corruption work of DICs is always overseen by the party committee and thus lacks independence. In 1977, the 11th Party Congress approved the new party constitution stipulating that discipline inspection work of DICs at all levels should be under the leadership of party committees at the same level. These introduced a lot of intervention from party committee to anti-corruption work. Then, the party constitution adopted in the 12th Party Congress in 1982 stipulated the “dual leadership” of local party committee at the same level and the DIC at the next higher level. However the local party committee takes the dominant position in practice. In 2013, the third plenary session of the 18th Party Congress further emphasised the upper-level DICs’ leadership over lower-level DICs, and allowed DICs to report their work directly to the upper-level DICs, bypassing local party committees. However, these measures did not violate the authority and leadership of the party committee (Guo 2014). Gong (2008) analyzed the revolution in the DIC’s function and status since 1921 in terms of institutionalism. She pointed out that, in spite of the continuous increase in its function, the DIC has gradually become the instrument of the CCP, serving to maintain the completeness and consistency of organisations, as a result of lacking independence.

## **Secretary of Discipline Inspection Commission**

The SDIC can have an important influence on the anti-corruption process and effects. In the investigation and double designation stages, the SDIC can determine whether to investigate the involved officials, the timetable of investigation and penalty decisions after double designation (Guo 2012). Inter alia, in the double designation stage, the DIC can carry out investigations without the approval of the judicial organ. Moreover, it is the SDIC who entirely control the process and results of the double designation. An extreme case is the former SDIC of Chenzhou city of Hunan province, Zeng Jinchun. During his term of office, once a case entered the double designation stage, Zeng persecuted officials and private entrepreneurs to bribe him in an illegal way, otherwise they would be investigated intensively.<sup>10</sup>

The SDIC is also the leader of the local anti-corruption coordination group. As presented in the bulletin of the sixth plenary session of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission held on 27 January 1996, all provinces, autonomous regions and direct-controlled municipalities had to establish an anti-corruption coordination group under the leadership of local party committees. Comprising among others the main leaders of relevant law-enforcing departments and discipline-enforcing departments, the group is designed to strengthen unified leadership and the coordination of major case investigations.<sup>11</sup> In 2007, the CDIC submitted its work report to the 17th Party Congress, which clearly stipulated that “The anti-corruption coordination groups at all levels should be led by SDICs at the same level.”<sup>12</sup> Members of the coordination group include leaders from the DIC, supervision, organization, public security, prosecution, court, audit and other departments, and the group office is located in the DIC.

The power of nomination and appointment of the SDIC determines its independence and also affects the DIC’s independence in investigating corruption cases. Before 2006, despite the party constitution rule that the DIC should work under the dual leadership of the party committee at the same level and the DIC at the next higher level, in practice, almost all SDICs are nominated by the party committees, or appointed from their members. Obviously, the party committee holds the power of personnel appointment and removal, hinders the DIC’s supervision of party and government leaders, and decreases the independence of the DIC as the discipline supervision institution; thus, it is unsuitable for promoting anti-corruption operation.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, after 2006, according to *Regulations of the Party and Government Leading Cadres’ Rotation Work*, the SDIC, as one of the local main leaders, had to be selected from among those who were not locally promoted. From then on, the airborne SDICs,<sup>14</sup> who are dispatched directly by the CDIC or transferred from other provinces, have gradually formed the majority of SDICs. [Figure 1](#) presents this trend.

## **Data**

### **Data sources**

The data are drawn from a panel of 31 provinces, direct-controlled municipalities and autonomous regions from 2003 to 2014, and contain information on anti-corruption efforts, characteristics of SDICs and provincial characteristics.

The database of provincial SDICs is collected from the public CVs of successive SDICs of every province published on the *People's Daily* online. It contains SDICs' basic and career information, namely, age, gender, nationality, native place, education, service in central offices or the law system, tenure, former workplace, destination after the SDIC. In total, there are 135 SDICs, or 141 person-year observations, in our dataset.

Anti-corruption data are collected from the *Chinese Procuratorial Yearbook* from 2004 to 2010, Chinese over-bureau-level corrupt cases reported on the CDIC website and other media. Information about central patrol groups is from the CDIC website and provincial government websites.

Data about the annual economic development level, population, finance, education attainment and other provincial indicators for every province are taken from the *Chinese Statistical Yearbook* from 2004 to 2014. The degree of marketisation is that noted by Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2010). The media exposure data are taken from the *Chinese Statistical Data of Press and Publications*.

## **Definition of variables**

### **Dependent variable**

This paper explores the influence of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption efforts. Similarly to the study by Cole, Elliott, and Zhang (2009),<sup>15</sup> we choose the average amount of corrupt money found among arrested corrupt officials (the average amount of corrupt money, for short) from 2004 to 2009 as an indicator of the dependent variable, which is reported by the procuratorial organ. Specifically, it is the ratio of the total amount of recovered corrupt money and the number of corrupt officials. In our opinion, the average amount of corrupt money better reflects the anti-corruption efforts for three reasons. First, the larger the amount of recovered money for each arrested corrupt official, the more efforts DICs should make, and this claim does not depend on the assumption that corruption levels are similar among all provinces. Second, given an official has been arrested for corruption, which may reflect the local corruption level, the efforts to recover corrupt money are more likely to reflect the degree of anti-corruption rather than corruption. Otherwise, the DIC can let off the corrupt officials by reducing recovery of corrupt money. After all, it would not harm the DIC. Third, we found a positive relationship between the average amount of corrupt money and SDIC promotion. That is, with a larger average amount of corrupt money, the probability of DIC promotion is higher, too. We use the natural logarithmic value of the average amount of corrupt money in regressions.

In addition, using the database of Chinese over-bureau-level arrested corrupt officials from 2003 to 2014, we calculate the annual anti-corruption strength index of 31 provinces as another indicator of anti-corruption efforts.<sup>16</sup> Specifically, we give different scores to officials according to their different levels, which are 6, 5, ..., 1, respectively, for levels from national to deputy bureau, and then multiply these scores with the provincial number of officials at every level. Finally, summing the six products together, we can get the annual anti-corruption strength index for every province. Values used in regressions are the ratios of these indexes and the population of provinces.



### *Explanatory variables*

Taking advantage of the exogenous policy shock of airborne SDICs, this paper uses the DID method to evaluate this policy empirically. To this end, we construct two dummy variables. The first one is “treatment group” ( $dprov$ ). The treatment group contains provinces whose SDIC changed from locally promoted to airborne in 2006. If a province  $i$  belongs to treatment group, then  $dprov$  is equal to one. Provinces meeting these conditions are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanxi, Jilin, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Henan, Guangdong, Chongqing and the others fall into the control group.<sup>17</sup> Airborne SDICs are distinct from the locally promoted ones who have served in the same province before becoming SDICs. This definition is consistent with the meaning of the “cadres” grown places<sup>18</sup> in *Regulations of the Party and Government Leading Cadres’ Rotation Work*.

The second dummy is “event year” ( $dyear$ ), defined as years after 2006, when  $dyear$  is equal to one, and otherwise zero. The reasons for choosing 2006 as the year of event are stated below. First, according to *Regulations of the Party and Government Leading Cadres’ Rotation Work* promulgated on 6 August 2006, it is necessary for SDICs at or above county level to have long-distance communication.<sup>19</sup> As shown in [Figure 1](#), airborne SDICs significantly increased after 2006, which is coincident with the policy. Second, it is the transition year of some SDICs in 2006. The provincial party congress, which is held once every five years, is the moment when main leaders of the provincial party committee and DIC change their terms of office contemporaneously. By comparing the resumes of SDICs with dates of provincial party congress, we find a match between provinces whose SDICs changed and those that experienced a concentrated transition in 2006.<sup>20</sup>

### *Control variables*

In this paper, we control the characteristics of SDICs and provinces. Personal characteristics of SDICs include three dimensions. (1) Gender, nationality and other basic information. (2) Education before work, service in the legal system, leadership of local administrative authorities. Those are important factors influencing the professionalism of SDICs in anti-corruption work (Guo 2014). (3) Tenure and its square term. The tenure of an SDIC is related to his or her political connection with local officials. With shorter tenure, SDICs can only obtain insufficient information, but longer tenure may help to establish networks between SDICs and local officials, each of which can affect effectiveness of the supervision work.

Provincial control variables consist of the following factors. (1) GDP per capita, which reflects the economic development of a certain province. Economic development and income level may influence residents’ tolerance of corruption. (2) Media exposure, reflecting the social supervision of the media. Referring to Besley and Burgess (2002) and Nie, Jiang, and Wang (2013), we use the annual number of newspaper pages printed in the province as an indicator. (3) Proportion of expenditure on public security and law enforcement within the total fiscal expenditure, which reflects the governmental spend on anti-corruption and affects the results directly. (4) Residents’ education level. Keen (2000) points out that education can improve residents’ awareness and understanding of the corruption problem, forcing the anti-corruption agency to intensify its efforts. This

**Table 1.** Characteristics of SDICs.

Variables	Observations <sup>a</sup>	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum <sup>b</sup>	Maximum
Airborne	98	0.44	0.50	0	1
Dispatched by the centre	98	0.14	0.35	0	1
Transferred from another province	98	0.28	0.45	0	1
Gender	98	0.87	0.34	0	1
Nationality	98	0.14	0.35	0	1
Native place	98	0.23	0.43	0	1
First education	98	0.65	0.48	0	1
Ever served in the law system	98	0.41	0.49	0	1
Ever been local leader	98	0.24	0.43	0	1
Tenure	98	4.59	2.28	1	12

Data source: the database of SDICs from 1994 to 2014 collected by the authors.

<sup>a</sup>The number of observations is 98 SDICs from 2003 to 2014, the same below.

<sup>b</sup>The variables airborne, dispatched by the centre, transferred from another province, ever served in the law system and ever been local leader are all dummies, which equal one when the answer is yes and otherwise zero. Gender dummy is one when SDIC is male, zero for female. Nationality dummy is one for minorities, zero for Han. Native place dummy equals one for the native, zero for those from other provinces. First education dummy is one for bachelor degree and above, otherwise zero.

paper measures education level using the number of college students per capita. (5) Degree of marketisation. As found by Sun, Lu, and Zhang (2005), with the improvement of marketisation degree, Chinese government increases its strength in terms of combating corruption. We adopt the marketisation index constructed by Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2010) as a proxy. They calculated this index taking many aspects into consideration, like the relationship between government and market, development of the non-state economy, and development of the product market and factor market. (6) Arrival times of the central patrol group. The central patrol group was established in 2003, and in recent years, the CDIC has constantly strengthened the patrol work, which may drive the inspection of the appropriate provinces. In regressions, GDP per capita and media exposure assume the natural logarithmic values.

### ***Descriptive statistics***

The data used in regressions contain SDICs of 31 provinces, autonomous regions and direct-controlled municipalities from 2003 to 2014, including 98 officials in total.<sup>21</sup> Among them, airborne SDICs account for 39 (41%). In particular, 12 SDICs were dispatched directly by the centre, accounting for 14%, and 26 were transferred from other provinces, accounting for 28%.

Other features of SDICs are presented in Table 1. Nearly 90% of SDICs are men, 23% of native places are the same as their working provinces, 65% have a bachelor degree or above as their first educational attainment, 41% have served in the law system and 24% have been local leaders. The average tenure of SDICs is 4.59 years, and the longest is 12 years.

## **Empirical results**

### ***Model specification***

This paper focuses on the influence of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption efforts. Taking advantage of an exogenous policy shock to the central advanced cadre exchange

in 2006, which suggested the quasi-natural experiment for this study, we use the DID method for policy evaluation, thus solving the endogenous problem. Using the provincial panel data for 2003 to 2009,<sup>22</sup> we construct a regression model as follows,

$$anti = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot (dprov_i \cdot dyear_t) + \beta_2 \cdot X_{i,t} + \mu_i + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (1)$$

Within this equation, the subscript  $i$  stands for province, and the subscript  $t$  stands for year. The *anti* is the proxy of anti-corruption efforts. The interaction  $dprov_i \cdot dyear_t$  is the explanatory variable. The parameter  $\beta_1$  measures the difference in average anti-corruption efforts before and after the change of SDIC from locally promoted to airborne in 2006, with the time trend removed. It reflects the effect of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption efforts. If  $\beta_1 > 0$ , it means that airborne SDICs contribute to improving anti-corruption efforts. On the other hand,  $\beta_1 < 0$  indicates that airborne SDICs have a negative influence. The  $X$  presents control variables including SDICs' and provincial characteristics, and  $\mu$  and  $\nu$  are the provincial and year fixed effects, respectively, and  $V$  is the disturbance term.

In practice, it is likely that the impact of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption is more apparent two or three years after the reform, rather than just the year of the policy implementation; there may be a time lag effect of the policy. However, Equation (1) can only identify an average policy effect on treatment group before and after the reform. Therefore, we adopt a more flexible specification, which includes interactions between the treatment group dummy and all years' dummies in the regression equation of anti-corruption. As Equation (2) shows,

$$anti = \beta_0 + \sum_{t=2004}^{2009} \beta_{1,t} \cdot (dprov_i \cdot year_t) + \beta_2 \cdot X_{i,t} + \mu_i + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (2)$$

Here, *year* is the dummy for year  $t, t = 2004, 2005, \dots, 2009$ . The parameter  $\beta$  reflects the impact of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption efforts in year  $t$ . If airborne SDICs are efficient against anti-corruption, then  $\beta$  should stay constant for  $t = 2004, 2005, 2006$ , until  $t \geq 2007$ , and  $\beta$  should jump to significantly positive values. Other symbols have the same implications as in Equation (1).

### Main regression results

Before the formal regression analysis, a simple comparison between treatment group and control group is presented. Figure 2 presents the average amount of corrupt money among arrested corrupt officials. It shows that before and after the event year, 2006, no significant change happens in the annual trends of the two groups, implying that airborne SDICs may have no significant effect on anti-corruption efforts.

Table 2 gives comparisons of main variables between treatment group and control group from 2003 to 2009. Among SDICs' characteristics, apparent difference only appears in careers, whereas other variables seem similar. The two groups differ in several provincial control variables, so we control all those variations when regressing to remove their interference in policy effects.<sup>23</sup>




Figure 2. Average amount of corrupt money of treatment and control group.

Table 2. DID descriptive statistics.

Variables	I. Treatment group		II. Control group	
	Observations <sup>a</sup>	Mean (standard error)	Observations	Mean (standard error)
<b>A. Anti-corruption efforts</b>				
Average amount of corrupt money	25	29.38* (6.01)	39	20.04 (2.52)
Anti-corruption strength index	70	2.23** (0.27)	119	1.57 (0.12)
<b>B. SDICs' characteristics</b>				
Gender	70	0.91 (0.05)	119	0.87 (0.03)
Nationality	70	0.19 (0.06)	119	0.18 (0.04)
First education	70	3.52*** (0.08)	119	3.42 (0.08)
Ever served in the law system	70	0.49** (0.07)	119	0.34 (0.04)
Ever been a local leader	70	0.00*** (0.03)	119	0.12 (0.03)
Tenure	14	5.07 (1.02)	19	5.84 (0.67)
<b>C. Provincial control variables</b>				
GDP per capita	70	2.53*** (0.22)	119	1.65 (0.12)
Media exposure	69	0.70*** (0.11)	116	0.30 (0.03)
Anti-corruption expenditure proportion	60	7.27*** (0.21)	102	6.22 (0.09)
Education	70	0.41*** (0.50)	119	0.20 (0.13)
Marketisation	52	7.62*** (0.34)	103	5.07 (0.22)
Arrival times of the central patrol groups	70	0.29 (0.07)	119	0.29 (0.04)

The data cover observations for 2003–2009. The data unit is province-year. An observation of tenure variable is an SDIC-province unit. Standard errors are given in parentheses.

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* Present significance level of 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.

With the average amount of corrupt money as dependent variable, and the airborne SDIC dummy as explanatory variable, we first regress with the OLS method as a reference. OLS results are listed in the first row of Table 3. After controlling SDICs' and provincial characteristics, along with the provincial and annual fixed effects, we see that the estimate of the explanatory variable is negative and non-significant. It indicates that airborne SDICs have not affected anti-corruption efforts significantly.

In order to separate out the impact of airborne SDICs and eliminate the possible endogeneity problem, we do regressions as Equation (1) with the DID method, with “treatment province · event year” as explanatory variable. Only controlling provincial and annual fixed effects, we get the results in row (2) of Table 3, whose estimate of interaction is negative and non-significant. SDICs' characteristics are added as control variables, such as gender, nationality, education and career and regression results are

Table 3. Main regression results.

	(1) OLS	(2) DID	(3) DID	(4) DID
Airborne SDIC	-0.405 (0.474)			
Interaction		-0.218 (0.374)	-0.401 (0.452)	-0.780 (1.539)
Gender	-0.152 (0.650)		-0.221 (0.367)	-0.408 (0.756)
Nationality	0.014 (0.389)		-0.155 (0.375)	-0.015 (0.386)
First education	0.007 (0.781)		0.085 (0.093)	-0.007 (0.192)
Ever served in the law system	0.194 (0.615)		0.521 (0.261)	0.164 (0.397)
Ever been a local leader	1.027 (0.734)		0.843 (0.492)	1.178 (0.882)
Tenure	0.532 (0.419)		0.370 (0.184)	0.628 (0.496)
Squared tenure	-0.052 (0.045)		-0.031 (0.015)	-0.057 (0.050)
Provincial control variables	Y	N	N	Y
Provincial/annual fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	50	64	64	47
R <sup>2</sup>	0.842	0.730	0.799	0.840

Dependent variable is the average amount of corrupt money. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The data cover observations from 2003 to 2009. Estimates of constant term are not presented in the table.


\*, \*\*, \*\*\* Present significance level of 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.

shown in row (3) of Table 3. On this basis, additionally controlling the provincial variables like economic development, media exposure, education level, anti-corruption expenditure, degree of marketisation and patrol times, we obtain estimates as given in row (4) of Table 3. According to the results in rows (2) to (4), none of the estimates of interaction are significant at all, which indicates that the impact of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption efforts is not significant.

Among control variables, the estimates of two dummies, one of which has ever served in the law system and the other has ever been a local leader, are significantly positive in part of the regressions; this indicates some degree to which professional acknowledgement and supervision experience of SDICs may promote anti-corruption. However, there is no significant effect of other characteristics. For provincial control variables, GDP per capita shows a negative effect in most regressions. A possible explanation is that with economic development and increase in residents' income, people become more tolerant of corruption, thus relieving pressure on DICs and lowering their motivation to combat corruption.<sup>24</sup>

The policy of airborne SDICs was formally implemented in 2006; however, the policy effects might differ in the years after that. One consideration is the lag effect, which leads to the policy effects of years closer to 2006 being less apparent. For this reason, we adopt a more flexible specification, the regression setting in Equation (2), to identify the impact of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption efforts in every year. Results are presented in Figure 3, and every point in the line represents the estimate of the relative year's interaction, i.e. the policy effect of this year. As we can see from the figure, estimates do not change significantly before and after the event year, 2006, and moreover none of them is statistically significant. This result proves the non-significant effect of airborne SDICs once more.

As shown in the regression results above, airborne SDICs have no significant impact on anti-corruption efforts. We speculate that under the dual leadership of the local party committees and the upper-level DICs, provincial DICs are subject to the local party committees in terms of personnel, funds and property, causing a lack of independence in their supervision work. Specifically, first, the personnel of DIC system are under the control of the local party committees. In addition, the DIC is not one of the money-making departments; the funds for implementing its remits are also transferred



**Figure 3.** Regression results of more flexible specification.

from their local party committee. Second, it is the party committee that arranges the DIC officials' career development – promotion or demotion – along with the coordination of other local departments. Third, being subordinate to the supreme leader of the host party committee, the SDIC can hardly supervise the party committee and its cadres at the same level. In contrast, the DIC may develop an attached or collusive relationship with leaders of the party committee. The new round of anti-corruption campaigns after the 18th Party Congress at the end of 2012 was totally dominated by the CDIC, and local DICs mainly played a cooperative role. As a result, there is no apparent impact of the independence of SDICs on anti-corruption efforts as yet.

### **Robustness checks**

The use of the DID method in the above regressions solves the possible endogeneity problem, and we conclude that there is no significant influence of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption efforts. However, there are still several concerns. First, the measures of anti-corruption have always been hotly discussed in academic circles. We chose the average amount of corrupt money initially, and next we will try more indicators. Second, airborne SDICs can be further divided into two types, those dispatched directly by the centre and those transferred from another province. Because of their different sources, these two types of SDICs may lead to varying influences on anti-corruption efforts, and this deserves separate analysis. Third, results may change because of variations in the grouping and range of samples. Attention should also be paid to the other factors possibly affecting anti-corruption efforts. Next, we conduct some robustness checks aimed at resolving these problems.

### **Other indicators of anti-corruption efforts**

We use the number of corrupt cases per capita and the number of corrupt officials per capita as dependent variables, respectively, to redo the regressions in [Table 3](#).<sup>25</sup>

**Table 4.** Regression results of anti-corruption strength index.

	(1) OLS 03–09	(2) OLS 03–14	(3) DID 03–09	(4) DID 03–09	(5) DID 03–09
Airborne SDIC	−3.098 (4.009)	1.665 (0.864)			
Interaction			0.979 (0.552)	1.100 (0.645)	−0.813 (1.146)
Gender	2.455 (1.712)	0.696 (1.025)		0.385 (0.353)	0.827 (0.422)
Nationality	0.662 (1.956)	−1.069 (0.988)		0.619 (0.486)	0.012 (0.579)
First education	−0.465 (1.796)	−0.367 (0.605)		0.009 (0.157)	0.147 (0.262)
Ever served in the law system	1.976 (3.090)	0.257 (0.501)		−0.133 (0.330)	0.445 (0.780)
Ever been a local leader	−2.434 (4.082)	−0.242 (0.866)		0.0283 (0.657)	0.558 (0.778)
Tenure	−1.127 (1.570)	−0.069 (0.500)		−0.109 (0.196)	−0.229 (0.344)
Squared tenure	0.092 (0.148)	0.012 (0.036)		0.011 (0.019)	0.030 (0.033)
Provincial control variables	Y	N	N	N	Y
Provincial/annual fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	142	430	216	216	127
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.788	0.616	0.288	0.304	0.398

Dependent variable is the anti-corruption strength index. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The data in row (1), (3), (4), and (5) cover observations from 2003 to 2009, and row (2) it covers from 2003 to 2014. Estimates of constant term are not presented in the table.

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* Present significance level of 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.

According to the results and controlling the provincial and SDICs' characteristics, we see that airborne SDICs have no significant impact on anti-corruption efforts.

In addition, using the database of Chinese over-bureau-level arrested corrupt officials from 2003 to 2014, we calculated the anti-corruption strength index as another indicator of anti-corruption efforts. Regression results are presented in Table 4. Row (1), covering data from 2003 to 2009 and using the OLS method, regresses the airborne dummy on the anti-corruption strength index. After controlling SDICs' and provincial characteristics and provincial and annual fixed effects, we see that the estimate of the explanatory variable is not significant, indicating no apparent impact on anti-corruption efforts. Using data from 2003 to 2014, we drop the provincial control variables from the regression in row (1) because of the lack of data and get the results shown in row (2), which is not essentially any different.<sup>26</sup> For rows (3) to (5), we use data from 2003 to 2009, and regress with the DID method to redo the regressions in Table 3. In those results, the estimates of the interaction are still not significant, so we can draw the same conclusion as before that no significant impact of airborne SDICs is identified on anti-corruption efforts.

### Sources of SDICs

Airborne SDICs can be further divided into two types, which are those dispatched directly by the centre and those transferred from other provinces. These types and local promotion constitute the three sources of SDICs. We explore the impacts on anti-corruption of these two types of 'airborne' SDICs. Using the province-level panel data from 2003 to 2009, we choose two dummies: dispatched directly by the centre ( $jw\_from\_cen_{i,t}$ ) and transferred from another province ( $jw\_other\_prov_{i,t}$ ) that are explanatory variables regressed with the OLS method. Results are shown in Table 5. The first row presents the estimates of the regression that only contains two explanatory variables, provincial and annual fixed effects, and the row (2) displays the characteristics of SDICs added as control variables; provincial variables are additionally controlled in row (3). Estimates of explanatory variables are not significant in all regressions, which indicates that airborne SDICs, no matter whether they are

Table 5. Sources of SDICs.

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS
Dispatched directly by the centre	-0.542 (0.348)	-0.598 (0.400)	-1.212 (0.703)
Transferred from another province	-0.029 (0.235)	-0.239 (0.356)	0.376 (0.758)
Gender		-0.196 (0.450)	-0.595 (0.535)
Nationality		-0.181 (0.340)	-0.262 (0.517)
First education		0.0536 (0.360)	-0.541 (0.790)
Ever served in the law system		0.513 (0.362)	-0.215 (0.618)
Ever been a local leader		0.611 (0.565)	1.484 (0.873)
Tenure		0.321 (0.188)	0.380 (0.485)
Squared tenure		-0.027 (0.016)	-0.035 (0.049)
Provincial control variables	N	N	Y
Provincial/annual fixed effects	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	69	69	50
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.759	0.814	0.854

Dependent variable is the average amount of corrupt money. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The data cover observations from 2003 to 2009. Estimates of constant term are not presented in the table.

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* Present significance level of 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.

dispatched directly by the centre or transferred from other provinces, have no significant impact on anti-corruption efforts.

### *Different control groups*

Provinces in the control group in previous regressions are all provinces excluding those where the SDIC changed from the locally promoted to airborne in 2006. They contain not only the provinces where the SDIC changed from one locally promoted to another locally promoted, but those where no transition happened in 2006. Among them, the provinces that perfectly meet the requirements of the control group are those where the SDICs changed but were locally promoted before and after the transition in 2006.<sup>27</sup>

The only distinction between these provinces and treatment provinces is the source of the SDIC after transition. Therefore, we shrink the previous control group to one only covering the perfect control provinces, then repeat the analysis above. We conclude again that airborne SDICs' impact on anti-corruption efforts is non-significant.

### *Other influential factors*

Furthermore, we consider the impacts of other SDICs' characteristics on anti-corruption efforts. The first is the native place of SDIC. If the native place is the same place where he or she serves as SDIC, there will usually be complex networks between the SDIC and local officials. As a result, conflicts between social and personal interests may arise during the anti-corruption process, which is detrimental to the objectivity and independence of supervision. We replace the airborne dummy with the native dummy, which equals one for native SDICs, and repeat the regressions in Table 3. The omitted results show that SDICs' native place does not significantly affect anti-corruption efforts.

The second factor is the tenure. On the one hand, tenure of SDICs can expand availability of corrupt information. On the other hand, SDICs with longer tenure are also likely to collude with local officials and act as their protective umbrella. For this reason, tenure and its squared term are controlled in regressions. As presented in the results, the impact of tenure or its squared term on anti-corruption efforts is not significant.



The last but not the least factor is the age of SDICs. When they are close to retirement age, there are fewer opportunities for promotion, and a decreasing incentive for supervision and anti-corruption, thus affecting the work effects. We use the age of SDICs and its squared term to replace the tenure and squared tenure above. Regression results show no significant influence of SDICs' age on anti-corruption efforts. This paper excludes all the interference with the policy effect caused by those possible influential factors.

## Conclusion

Recently, provincial SDICs have tended to be airborne. Almost 60% of current SDICs are dispatched directly by the centre or transferred from other provinces. This phenomenon marks that the CDIC has seized the appointment power of SDICs, which enhances the authority of the upper-level DICs to the lower-level ones. This change is expected to have a positive influence on current anti-corruption operation. However, its practical effect remains to be explored.

This paper investigates the practical impact of an institutional reform, airborne SDICs, on anti-corruption efforts. In 2006, the Central Party Committee encouraged the rotation of leading cadres. This exogenous policy shock resulted in changing SDICs from local to airborne in several provinces, which provides us with a good quasi-natural experiment. Therefore, on the basis of provincial-level panel data from 2003 to 2014, and using the DID method, this paper empirically analyses the influence of airborne SDICs on anti-corruption efforts. Regression results show that after we controlled provincial and SDICs' characteristics, whether SDICs are airborne, including directly dispatched by the centre and transferred from other provinces, has no significant impact on anti-corruption efforts, and this conclusion is robust to different indicators of anti-corruption and subsamples.

In our view, the dual leadership in the DIC system still requires reform in order to ensure local DICs enjoying more independence. Essentially, distinct from the Commission Against Corruption in China's Hong Kong and Corrupt Practices in Singapore, The Chinese DIC is not an independent supervision institution. In this situation, the separate transference of SDICs can hardly work efficiently. To solve this dilemma, the DIC system demands a gradual transformation from the current semi-vertical administration to a vertical administration. That is, DICs at every level are completely attached to the CDIC, with the personnel, funds and property of the DIC system all assigned by the CDIC. Under the current administrative system, examples are State Administration of Work Safety, State Administration of Taxation and General Administration of Customs. Certainly, since CCP is the only ruling party in China, and its branches are the topmost authorities at all the administrative levels. Differently from Western developed countries, these direct administrative agencies (*tiaoguan danwei*) should coordinate their duties with those of the local party committees. Only in this way can we enhance the de facto independence of DICs at every level, and allow the supervision agency to work free of the interference of the leaders of local party committees and governments.

## Notes

1. For more details, view website at [http://www.china.org.cn/china/third\\_plenary\\_session/2014-01/16/content\\_31212602.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm).
2. This paper pays most attention to provincial SDICs. Unless indicated otherwise, all DICs and SDICs mentioned, respectively, refer to provincial DICs and provincial SDICs.
3. 'Local promotion' means that the SDIC was in office in the same province before becoming an SDIC.
4. In this paper, airborne SDICs refer to those officials who are from the centre or other provinces before they accept the appointment of SDIC.
5. *People's Daily* online at <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0112/c1001-26364693.html>.
6. In the sense of the Western concept of *independence*, an anti-corruption agency is independent if it is directly led by the top administration and has nothing to do with a local authority. However, the CCP and its branches are the top authority at all the administrative levels in China, so there is no absolute agency independence in China. What we are talking about is relative independence.
7. Our methodology is standard econometrics with regression and datasets. Although we will introduce the related institutional background in the next section, there are no case studies or interviews. Of course, some qualitative interviews with the secretaries concerned were helpful to our research.
8. The former Soviet Union also set up discipline inspection institutions within the ruling party (see Sullivan [1984] for more details).
9. *Responsibility of the Discipline Inspection Commission to Assist the Party's Organisation and Coordination of Anti-Corruption Work* issued in 2005 gives more detailed regulations on this.
10. View Xinhua net at [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-04/26/content\\_8054915.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-04/26/content_8054915.htm).
11. *People's Daily* online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/11/20000804/172007.html>.
12. View *NetEase* at <http://news.163.com/07/1026/18/3ROIHO050001124J.html>.
13. Even though the local party chiefs can interfere in DIC's work, it does not mean that the local party chiefs can act willfully, because they are checked and balanced by the CDIC.
14. The airborne SDIC dates back to 1995, when it first appeared in Zhangjiajie city of Hunan province. At that time, the DIC of the city appointed eight outstanding cadres to DICs of counties as SDICs at the county level. This action achieved efficient anti-corruption efforts and is called 'the Zhangjiajie model' (Gong 2008).
15. Cole, Elliott, and Zhang (2009) use the average number of arrested corrupt officials per capita to indicate anti-corruption efforts. They point out that, assuming the corruption levels are similar among all provinces, this indicator will reflect the anti-corruption efforts. Moreover, the Supreme People's Procuratorate also regards it as the index of local anti-corruption achievements. This indicator is used for one of the robustness checks in our paper.
16. There are two reasons why we choose only the over-bureau-level corrupt officials. First, the over-bureau-level corrupt officials have more information available than lower-level officials. Second, the over-bureau-level officials are within their local provincial SDICs' jurisdiction.
17. There were more than two changes of SDIC sources in Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Hubei provinces from 2003 to 2009, so we deleted these provinces from our samples.
18. Places where cadres have been in office for a long time before being promoted to an important position or to the current position.
19. See [http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2006-08/06/content\\_7080432.htm](http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2006-08/06/content_7080432.htm).
20. Existing literature and some media reports have also treated the year 2006 as the turning point of airborne SDICs, such as Gong (2008) and the *People's Daily* online (2007) at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64100/5627795.html>.
21. There are two SDICs who have served in more than one province between 2003 and 2014.

22. This paper restricts data from 2003 to 2009 for two reasons. First, after 2010, airborne SDICs with shorter tenures are more common. There are such frequent changes in SDICs' sources that the data are no longer fit for analysis with the DID method. Second, the anti-corruption data provided by the *Chinese Procuratorial Yearbook* ceased being updated after 2010.
23. When we regress the average amount of corrupt money before 2006 on the treatment group dummy using the Probit model, results indicate no significant influence of the average amount of corrupt money on group selection.
24. Because of space limitations, estimates of provincial control variables are omitted in all regression result tables.
25. The results of these regressions are omitted because of space limitations.
26. Results are consistent when we use the data for 2003–2013 having added the provincial control variables.
27. These provinces are Heilongjiang, Shandong, Hunan, Hainan, Sichuan, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Qinghai and Ningxia.

## Acknowledgements

The authors thank Li-an Zhou, Xianbin Wang and participators of conferences at Sun Yat-sen University and Renmin University of China for valuable remarks. Nie acknowledges the National Program for Support of Top-Notch Young Professionals.

## Disclosure statement

The authors report no conflicts of interest. The authors alone are responsible for the content and writing of this article.

## References

- Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess. 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4): 1415–1451.
- Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik. 2002. "Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China." *China Quarterly* 170: 361–386.
- Burns, John P. 2003. "Downsizing' the Chinese State: Government Retrenchment in the 1990s." *China Quarterly* 175: 775–802.
- Cheng, Li, and Lynn White. 1990. "Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy." *China Quarterly* 121: 1–35.
- Cheng, Li, and Lynn White. 2003. "The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?" *Asian Survey* 43 (4): 553–597.
- Cole, Matthew A., Robert J. R. Elliott, and Jing Zhang. 2009. "Corruption, Governance and FDI location in China: A Province-Level Analysis." *Journal of Development Studies* 45 (9): 1494–1512.
- De Sousa, Luis. 2010. "Anti-corruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance." *Crime, law and social change* 53 (1): 5–22.
- Dong, Bin, and Benno Torgler. 2013. "Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China." *China Economic Review* 26: 152–169.
- Edin, Maria. 2003. "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective." *China Quarterly* 173: 35–52.

- Fan, Gang, Xiaolu Wang, and Hengpeng Zhu. 2010. *Zhongguo Shichanghua Zhishu: Gedi qu Shichanghua Xiangdui Jincheng 2009 Nian Baogao [2009 Report on NERI Index of Regional Marketization of China]*. Beijing: Economic Science Press.
- Gong, Ting. 2008. "The Party Discipline Inspection in China: Its Evolving Trajectory and Embedded Dilemmas." *Crime, Law and Social Change* 49 (2): 139–152.
- Guo, Xuezhi. 2014. "Controlling Corruption in the Party: China's Central Discipline Inspection Commission." *China Quarterly* 219: 597–624.
- Guo, Yong. 2008. "Corruption in Transitional China: An Empirical Analysis." *China Quarterly* 194: 349–364.
- Guo, Yong. 2012. "The Evolvement of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection Commission in the Reform Era." *China Review* 12 (1): 1–23.
- He, Zengke. 2000. "Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Reform China." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 33 (2): 243–270.
- Huther, Jeff, and Anwar Shah. 2000. *Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for Evaluation*. Working Paper No. 2501. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Keen, Ellie. 2000. *Fighting Corruption through Education*. Budapest, Hungary: Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute, COLPI Papers, No. 1.
- Lu, Xiaobo. 2000. "Booty Socialism, Bureau-Preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China." *Comparative Politics* 32 (3): 273–294.
- Manion, Melanie. 1985. "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders." *China Quarterly* 102: 203–233.
- Manion, Melanie. 1997. "Corruption and Corruption Control: More of the Same in 1996." In *China Review, 1997*, edited by Maurice Brousseau, Hsin-Chin Kuan, and Yak-Yeow Kueh, 33–56. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press.
- Meagher, Patrick. 2004. "Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Review of Experience." The Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) at University of Maryland, The IRIS Discussion Papers on Institutions and Development, Paper No. 04/02.
- Meagher, Patrick. 2005. "Anti-corruption Agencies: Rhetoric Versus Reality." *Journal of Policy Reform* 8 (1): 69–103.
- Mertha, Andrew C. 2005. "China's 'Soft' Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations." *China Quarterly* 184: 791–810.
- Nie, Huihua. 2014. "Fubai dui Xiaolu de Yingxiang: Yige Wenxian Zongshu" [Impact of Corruption on Efficiency: A Literature Review]. *Jinrong Pinglun (Chinese Review of Financial Studies)* 9 (1): 13–23.
- Nie, Huihua, Mengqi Wang. 2014. "Zhengzhi Zhouqi dui Fanfubai de Yingxiang: Jiyu 2003–2013 Nian Zhongguo Tingji Yishang Guanyuan Fubai Anli de Zhengju" [The Impact of Political Cycles on Combating Corruption: Evidence from Chinese Bureau-Level Corruption Cases During 2003–2013]. *Jingji Sheui Tizhi Bijiao [Comparative Economic and Social Systems]* 174 (4): 4–14.
- Nie, Huihua, Minjie Jiang, and Xianghong Wang. 2013. "The Impact of Political Cycle: Evidence from Coalmine Accidents in China." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 41 (4): 995–1011.
- Pope, Jeremy. 1999. *The Need and Role of an Independent Anti-Corruption Agency*. Working Paper for Transparency International. [http://www.transparency.org/working\\_paper/pope/jpope\\_iaca.html](http://www.transparency.org/working_paper/pope/jpope_iaca.html), accessed on September 19, 2015.
- Pope, Jeremy, and Frank Vogl. 2000. "Making Anticorruption Agencies More Effective." *Finance and Development* 37 (2): 6–9.
- Quade, Elizabeth A. 2007. "The Logic of Anticorruption Enforcement Campaigns in Contemporary China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 16 (50): 65–77.
- Quah, Jon S. T. 1999. "Comparing Anti-Corruption Measures in Asian Countries: Lessons to be Learnt." *Asian Review of Public Administration* XI (2): 71–90.
- Sullivan, Lawrence R. 1984. "The Role of the Control Organs in the Chinese Communist Party, 1977–83." *Asian Survey* 24 (6): 597–617.

- Sun, Gang, Ming Lu, and Jipeng Zhang. 2005. "Fanfubai, Shichang Jianshe Yu Jingji Zengzhang" [Anti-Corruption, Market Construction and Economic Growth]. *Jingjixue (Jikan)* [China Economic Quarterly] 18 (4): 1–22.
- Transparency International. 2007. *Global Corruption Report 2007*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wong, Christine P. W. 1987. "Between Plan and Market: The Role of the Local Sector in Post-Mao China." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 11 (3): 385–398.
- Wu, Jinglian. 1988. "Xunzu Lilun yu Woguo Jingji Zhong de Mouxie Xiaoji Xianxiang" [Theory of 'Rent-seeking' and Some Negative Phenomenon in China's Economy]. *Jingji Shehui Tizhi Bijiao* [Comparative Economic and Social Systems]. 5: 1–2.
- Wu, Yiping, and Jiangnan Zhu. 2011. "Corruption, Anti-Corruption, and Inter-County Income Disparity in China." *Social Science Journal* 48 (3): 435–448.
- Zang, Xiaowei. 1993. "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?" *Asian Survey* 33 (8): 787–803.