

《现代产业组织理论》教学提纲

聂辉华

Industrial Organization Theory

Spring 2009

Compulsory for graduates in Majors of Business Economics and Network Economics

Instructor: Huihua NIE

Office hours: all the time by appointment

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Credit hour: 3

Course Meet: 02/18/2009 – 06/24/2009

Room: **Ming De Main Building**（明德主楼）**0304**

Wed.: 18:00–20:30

Final exam date: 06/24/2009

Course Website <http://www.niehuihua.com>（白鲨在线）

Textbook

Required:

(M) Martin, Stephen, 2002, *Advanced Industrial Organization*, 2E, Cambridge, MA:

Blackwell publishers（斯蒂芬·马金，《高级产业经济学》，上海财经大学出版社，2003年）

(T) Tirole, Jean, 1988, *The Theory of Industrial Organization*, Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press（泰勒尔：《产业组织理论》，中国人民大学出版社，1997年）

Optional:

(HM) Hay, D. A. and Morris, D. J. 1991, *Industrial Economics and Organization*,

Oxford University Press（海、莫瑞斯，《产业经济学与组织》，经济科学出版社，2001年）

(LT) Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole, 1993, *A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation*, MIT press (拉丰、梯若尔, 《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》, 上海三联书店, 2004年)

Handbook of Industrial Organization, Eds. Schmalensee, R. and Willig, R., Vol. I, II and III, Elsevier, 1989

Prerequisites

This course presumes that students have a familiarity with microeconomics, basic game theory, contract theory and some econometrics.

Course Objectives

The course provides a graduate level introduction to Industrial Organization. It is designed to provide a broad introduction to topics and industries that current researchers are studying as well as to expose students to a wide variety of techniques. It will start from basic topics including monopoly, strategic competition, entry & exit, R & D, and so on, and also important adventure on regulatory, auction and two-sided markets. The course tries to integrate traditional and new IO, theoretical models and empirical studies into one unified body.

Preparing for Class

It's better for you to read the relevant chapter(s) or papers in ahead of the time, which should be great helpful for you understanding the content of lectures.

Grading

There will have one final exam, a number of homework assignments and presentations. The homework assignments include all the review questions corresponding to the chapters that we cover in the lectures. The answers that just simply copy those at the back of the textbook will be scored zero. The presentation

will be counted, furthermore it is necessary to get your final grade. Grades will be determined as follows:

Homework 30%

Presentation 20%

Final Exam 50%

Policies

I don't accept any excuse for the missing of exams unless you can provide proof of emergency such as serious illness. If you miss the exam for any reason that does not qualify as a proven emergency, you get zero. You can work with your classmates on the homework assignments, but you are not allowed to copy someone else's work.

Course Schedule

1 An Introduction to IO

1.1 Basic schools

1.2 SCP paradigm

References

M ch.1, ch.5

HM ch.1, ch.5

2 Monopoly

2.1 Monopoly and welfare

- single product pricing
- multi-product pricing
- the welfare loss of monopoly: theory and evidence

References

T ch.1

HM ch.16

2.2 Price discrimination

- first-degree price discrimination
- second-degree price discrimination
- third-degree price discrimination

References

T ch.3

HM ch.6.2, 7.4, 7.6

2.3 Vertical control

- basic framework
- externality and vertical control
- competition within brands

References

T ch.4

HM ch.6.1

Tan, Guofu, 2001, “The Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints”, University of British Columbia, working paper

Rey, Patrick, and Jean Tirole, 2007, “A Primer on Foreclosure”, in *Handbook of Industrial Organization III*, edited by Mark Armstrong and Rob Porter, Elsevier

3 Strategic Behaviors

3.1 Static price competition

- Bertrand model
- Cournot model

References

T ch.5

M ch.2, ch.3

3.2 Product differentiation

- Hotelling model
- advertising and product differentiation

References

T ch.7

M ch.4

3.3 Dynamic price competition and collusion

- repeated games
- reputation

References

T ch.6

M ch.10

3.4 Information and strategic behavior

- limit pricing
- predatory pricing

References

T ch.9

M ch.8

3.5 Entry and exit

- fixed cost and natural monopoly
- competition strategy

References

T ch.8

3.6 Advertise

- advertising expenditure model
- advertising and entry barrier
- advertising and consumer behavior

References

HM ch.5

M ch.9

3.7 R & D

- patent races
- patent protection
- patent and welfare: evidence

References

T ch.10

M ch.14

HM ch.13

4 Regulation

4.1 Introduction

- regulatory environment and institutions
- usual incentive scheme
- new regulatory economics

References

LT ch.0

4.2 Costs-reimbursement rules

- discrete model
- the implementation of incentive scheme
- commitment problem

References

LT ch.1

4.3 Regulation in developing countries

- overview of characteristics of developing countries
- design of regulatory institutions

References

Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2005, *Regulation and Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

4.5 Regulation of electricity industry in China: theory and evidence

- background
- regulatory modes

- deregulation

5. Two-sided markets

Armstrong, M., 2005, "Competition in Two-Sided Markets", *Rand Journal of Economics*,
forthcoming

Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole, 2004, "Two-Sided Markets: An Overview", Mimeo, IDEI, Universite
de Toulouse